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v
The topic of family farms has been gaining prominence in the academic, policy, and donor
communities in recent years. Small farms dominate the agricultural landscape in the
developing world, providing the largest source of employment and income to the rural poor,
yet smallholders remain highly susceptible to poverty and hunger. With the advance of global-
ization and greater integration of agricultural markets, the need for increases in agricultural
productivity for family farms is particularly pressing. Raising productivity and output of small
farmers would not only increase their incomes and food security, but also stimulate the rest of
the economy and contribute to broad-based food security and poverty alleviation.
In this paper, Michael Lipton builds an argument for greater focus on pro-smallholder crop
science as a key solution to generate increases in productivity and income. Increasing the
levels of investment into agricultural technology, improving water and land use and distri-
bution, and creating positive incentives for developing-country farmers come to the forefront
of the paper as critical steps that must be taken to ensure massive reduction in global poverty.
Favorable demographic trends over the next few decades provide a window of opportunity
for reforms and action that must not be squandered. 
The future of smallholders is an important research theme at IFPRI. Several studies are
currently underway that address the impact of changing agricultural markets on small farmers.
In addition, IFPRI and its 2020 Vision Initiative is collaborating with the Overseas
Development Institute and Imperial College London in organizing a research workshop on
“The Future of Small Farms” in June 2005 in Wye, England, that will bring together leading
experts to review the available evidence on the current and future status of smallholders in the
world. 
We hope that the release of this discussion paper on the eve of “The Future of Small
Farms” workshop will stimulate and enrich the debate and provide valuable insights for articu-
lating critical steps to strengthening family farms. The paper significantly contributes to
developing this emerging theme at IFPRI, helping to identify research priorities and to better
position IFPRI to undertake policy research on the future of small farms. It is an important step
toward accumulating a body of knowledge on the topic and shaping an agenda for action.
Joachim von Braun
Director GeneralAn earlier version of this paper was presented as a plenary paper to the Fourth International
Crop Science Congress held in Brisbane, Australia, in September 2004. I am grateful to Tony
Fischer and Jim Ryan, and to Thomas Jayne and two other IFPRI referees, for helpful
comments; I remain responsible for content and errors.
Acknowledgments
viFamily farms are operated units that derive most labor and enterprise from the farm family.
They have proved resilient, even in the rich world, and small family farms dominate
agriculture in East and South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Yet these are areas of concen-
trated poverty: in 2004, they contained over 92 percent of the world’s 1.1 billion “dollar-
poor” (households consuming less than one U.S. dollar’s worth of a world average
consumption bundle, per person per day, at 1993 purchasing-power-parity values). Kick-
starting the reduction of mass dollar poverty normally requires accelerated growth of
staples output on family farms. Whether this is feasible and sufficient depends on national
political and economic incentives and institutions to create and apply appropriate crop
science, land and water access, and open markets in the context of appropriate state-led
provision of public and merit goods. Many Asian and Latin American countries have gone
a long way on this path, but they still have far to go. Much of Africa has hardly started.
Progress is made possible by new science and by a crucial demographic shift—but is
handicapped by rich-world policies towards agriculture, trade, and science.
The Argument
1.  Family farms have advantages that enable them to dominate. Small farms have lower
labor-related transaction costs and more family workers per hectare, each motivated to
work and to find, screen, and supervise hired workers. Large farms have lower capital- and
land-related transaction costs, allowing owners to more readily finance equipment, which
they can use over many hectares. So small farms have advantages in early-developing
countries, which have low capital per unskilled worker and scarce land per person, while
large farms win out in developed countries, with more savings, capital, and (usually) good
rural land per unit of unskilled rural labor. 
Despite differing farm size and techniques, family management dominates farming at
all levels of development. Consequently—unlike virtually any other major sector, even
retailing—the economic advantages of family oversight prevail in farming across a wide
range of development levels, typical farm sizes, capital/land/labor ratios, and types of
product and ecology. Data strongly suggest that such farms retain competitive advantages
despite market distortions, and despite some genuine and growing market handicaps as
agricultural supply chains globalize and concentrate. The evolution of the family farm is
thus linked to economic development. 
Almost all family farms are now commercial, profit-seeking enterprises. The persistence
and power of family farming not only chart a credible course for evolving farmers in Africa
and Asia but also help explain the Northern farm protectionism that makes their lives so
hard.
Executive Summary
vii2.  The Green Revolution provided a special type of growth in family farm productivity, partly
by luck. A country normally needs to provide the poor with higher employment, higher
unskilled wage-rates, and/or more command over low-cost food staples to initiate major
cuts in mass dollar poverty. Productivity growth in small family farming alone usually has
the potential to raise all three. Normally this later permits, and induces, further poverty
reduction via cash-cropping, rural nonfarm work, and shifts to urban employment and
income growth. But mass dollar poverty reduction almost always starts with large, widely
shared increases in profitably produced farm output (especially food staples) and profitably
sought and offered farm employment mainly on family farms. Especially as land gets
scarcer, this requires a technology-based agricultural revolution. But even if that works,
stringent conditions must be met for the main dollar-poverty groups—small farmers, rural
laborers, and the urban poor—to benefit. There are virtually no examples of mass dollar
poverty reduction since 1700 that did not start with sharp rises in employment and self-
employment income due to higher productivity in small family farms.   
However, while farm growth is necessary to initiate mass poverty reduction, it may not
be  feasible or  sufficient to overcome binding land and water constraints. Feasibility
depends on availability, quality, and distribution of farmland (and water); crop, land, and
water science; and prospects for national and global trade and exchange, and their effects
on farm sales and prices. Sufficiency depends on a corresponding rise in the poor’s
command over staple foods. Even large increases in staple food productivity would do little
to cut mass dollar poverty if they were confined to large-scale farms, using tractors and
combines but few workers, and selling at government-boosted prices that the underem-
ployed and near-landless poor cannot afford. 
The Green Revolution not only increased the supply of locally available staples but also
the demand for farm labor, wage-rates, and thus the work-based income of the dollar-poor.
The lesson for future crop science policy is clear. When choosing among research paths,
a high employment share in extra science-induced farm income should normally be seen
as a gain. For countries where the dollar-poor lose out if the demand for farm labor
declines, aid-backed farm research should not support better combines, herbicides,
mechanical transplanters—or varieties whose advantages depend on these—unless the
results can be shown to be cost-effective ways to cut poverty.
3.  Mass poverty can be slashed by farm-based progress given three predisposing, perhaps
necessary, preconditions. Widescale pro-poor progress based on crop science for small
family farms does not initially need good roads, credit, extension, and so on, helpful though
they are, but the following are almost always essential: (a) total factor productivity (TFP)
growth on farms via locally profitable and (usually) employment-intensive technology; (b)
land and water that are neither very unequally distributed nor unsustainably used; and (c)
farm production patterns that are not too vulnerable to disabling of incentives by domestic
or overseas policies that sharply erode or distort farm prices; by unshiftable initial
conditions, such as imposed gross land inequality; or by inbuilt adverse trends, such as
poor farmers or workers not just producing but being locked into commodities where
science-induced progress leads to more-than-offsetting price erosion. 
4.  Formal science is increasingly needed to satisfy the technology precondition. With the
population acceleration of 1730–2000 and the increasing scarcity of unfarmed, high-
quality land, poverty reduction increasingly required TFP-increasing technical progress to be
faster, more yield-enhancing, and employment-intensive. To achieve this, farm-based
viiiinnovation remained necessary, complementing (but increasingly elbowed out by) formal,
off-farm science.  
5.  Formal farm science needs radical reform to improve pro-poor results. The Green Revolution
could not escape the law of diminishing returns. Despite success in parts of rainfed Asia and
some of Africa, past evidence suggests severe limitations on conventional plant breeding, and
research based on the Mendelian breakthrough has increasingly had to focus on maintaining
yields rather than raising them. Radical scientific and institutional innovation is needed.
Private companies need to see public-purpose research outcomes as made profitable, mainly
by contracts to achieve specific outcomes to raise family-farm productivity or robustness in
neglected areas and crops.
6.  The land/water distribution necessary for family farming to cut mass dollar poverty is
violated in southern and eastern Africa. Regions with mass poverty, such as southern and
parts of eastern Africa, where family farming has been subverted (mostly by colonial land
grab, but sometimes by inequality within traditional land systems or by the politicized
economy of land redistribution) need to get their large, low-employment landholdings to
shift towards not-too-unequal family farms, as consensually as is feasible.
7.  Land/water sustainability is most threatened by crop expansion into marginal lands. Some
aspects of intensification raise serious environmental concerns: loss of biodiversity, inappro-
priate or excessive pesticide use, water and plant nutrient depletion, salinity and
waterlogging, and nitrate and nitrite buildup in drinking water imperfectly separated from
excess nitrogen fertilization and ill-drained farm water. These environmental concerns,
while not obviating the need for yield-increasing intensification through innovation in crop
science, may narrow the acceptable means to that end.
8.  Rich countries’ farm support has increased, undermining incentives for developing-country
agriculture. Most developing countries have greatly reduced the destruction of incentives to
employment-intensive farming, but the baton has passed to the North, (a) through state
subsidies and protection that stimulate Northern farmers to overproduce, thereby glutting
world markets and reducing incentives to Southern farmers; and (b) through the effect of
such protection in inducing Northern farmers to pay for more national science, producing
yet more output than would be commercial at free prices. This output compounds the effect
of directly subsidy-induced overproduction in undermining farm incentives for the South. In
addition, global science is diverted away from the farm goals of the poor towards
demands inflated by Western farm support for labor-saving production. To some extent, the
prospects of better crop science to help the rural poor in globalizing economies depend on
agricultural trade and policy reform in OECD nations. 
9.  Small-scale family farmers in rich countries are a major effective pressure towards farm
supports, which impede the absolute poor in poor countries. Political economy, not malice,
is at work. Nevertheless, it is small and family farms in the North that perpetuate its farm
support regimes and, in democracies, underpin rich farmers’ lobbying for ever-greater farm
support. The OECD and emerging-country family-farm lobbies will not respond to economic
theory alone, however valid; but if the lobby is reasoned with and shown alternatives,
victory is possible.
10.  Remedies are urgent to take advantage of the population slowdown in developing
countries, with its temporary but sharp effect in cutting the dependency ratio. Lower
proportions of dependents create a window of opportunity for growth and poverty
ixreduction. The process began with large declines in infant mortality rates during 1945–60.
Though these initially raised dependency ratios, the “saved” infants grew to working age,
fertility fell, and dependency ratios also began to fall, as in Africa and South Asia today.
Thus offers a window to help the poor out of poverty. However, if extra farm employment
prospects are not provided by crop science and appropriate policy, the extra workers will
face downward pressures on employment and wage-rates. The opportunity will then be lost
as, after 2030–50, aging populations pull the dependency ratio up again. 
11.  Can crop science for family farms help the poor to gain from globalization? Given that
most developing areas are labor-rich and capital-poor, most globalization should increase
their specialization in high-employment farms and crops, which should make attacking
mass poverty easier through extra employment, productivity, food output, and income
growth from small family farms. Apart from growth effects, globalization should, within
developing countries, make income distribution more pro-poor.
Conclusion
Mass poverty reduction initially depends on widespread growth of farm productivity and
employment income, and hence on specific scientific progress, usable by small family
farmers, mostly in so far recalcitrant areas. Such science needs to see productive
employment creation in agriculture as a benefit, not a cost.
xFamily farms are operated units in which most labor
and enterprise come from the farm family, which
puts much of its working time into the farm. Family
farms, many now quite large, have proved resilient
even in the rich world. In East and South Asia and
Sub-Saharan Africa, small family farms dominate
(see pages 4–5).
1
Poverty is concentrated in those areas. In
2004, they contained over 92 percent of the
world’s 1.1 billion “dollar-poor.”
2 As in developed
countries before 1900, so in developing countries
since 1950: kick-starting the reduction of mass
dollar poverty normally requires accelerated growth
of staples output on family farms. Whether this is
feasible and sufficient depends on (a) national
political and economic incentives and institutions to
create and apply appropriate crop science,
3 (b)
land and water access for the efficient farming poor
(meaning those who can farm competitively and
hence efficiently), and (c) opening and widening
markets in the context of appropriate state-led
provision of public and merit goods. Many Asian
and Latin American countries, notably China and
India, have gone a long way on this path, but they
still have far to go. Much of Africa has hardly
started. Progress has been handicapped by rich-
world policies towards agriculture, trade, and
science.
Crop science via farmers’ experiments has
driven smallholder productivity forward for
millennia, but slowly. An increasingly predominant
part has been played by formal crop science;
4
however, despite continuing advances, staples yield
growth rates in developing countries peaked in the
1970s and have since fallen sharply (see page 15).
Alongside the collapse of aid to agriculture (see
footnote 24), international agricultural research
funding stagnated from the 1980s to the early
2000s. In most of Africa and in some other
developing countries (not including India and
China), domestically financed investment in agricul-
ture has been sluggish or falling, so total investment
1.  Prologue: Key Concepts and Their Relevance
1 “Dominate” in this paper is shorthand for “account for a big majority of farm value-added, workforce, and area.”
2 Meaning those in households consuming less than one U.S. dollar’s worth of a world average consumption bundle, per person
per day, at 1993 purchasing-power-parity (PPP) values (World Bank 2004b). This assumes consumption distributed in propor-
tion to need within the household and across seasons; to the extent that it is not, dollar poverty is underestimated. Since a dollar
buys more of a typical consumption bundle in developing countries than in developed countries, a person can be above the
dollar poverty line with much less than $1 per day at official exchange rates (for example, only about 20 cents in India).
Acceptable nationwide household surveys, permitting dollar poverty to be estimated, exist for over 95 percent of the popula-
tion of the developing world. Poverty is a bundle of deprivations; dollar poverty is just one of them (Chen and Ravallion 2004;
Lipton and Ravallion 1995).
3 Livestock has a major role for the poor, especially the landless poor, and should form part of the solution to poverty and
agricultural productivity growth in the South. This has been emphasized by three commentators, one of whom writes: “Mixed
crop–livestock farming can play a key role in spreading labor peaks, maintaining soil fertility, improving timeliness of plowing,
and increasing crop productivity. Worldwide, the livestock feed industry serves as a key buffer, stabilizing inter-annual price
swings” (personal communication with author). However, the very poor often cannot afford the risks or capital costs of
largestock. Staples—with their higher per hectare value-added and employment, and given spreading land scarcities—play a
leading, in some areas rising, role in the production, consumption, and above all employment income of the rural poor.
4 This role is most effective, however, when guided by farmers’ research and their production priorities (IFAD 2001, 140).
12
in agriculture and its scientific and other infrastruc-
tures declined. 
Demographics are potentially very helpful in
spreading, to Africa and the poorer parts of Asia,
the rapid falls in poverty achieved elsewhere. That
potential can be realized if—but only if—there is
renewed focus on improving smallholder yields. In
East Asia during 1970–2000, the proportions of
people of prime working or saving age (15–64
years old) rose significantly. Partly as a result, and
aided by East Asia’s science-based, job-creating,
and food-cheapening farm transformation, dollar
poverty incidence fell by over two-thirds. For similar
reasons, the ratios of workers to dependents are
rising even faster in today’s poverty heartlands (see
page 20).
5 Yet similar poverty impact requires
similar farm transformation. In East Asia, the extra
workers could escape poverty (for themselves and
their relatively fewer dependents) by finding work
with rising income and productivity. Initially, most of
this extra work was on labor-intensive smallhold-
ings, inducing expansion in rural nonfarm
employment later. However, in most of Africa, and
parts of Asia too, the extra workers are not enjoying
comparable growth in labor demand. That is
largely for want of East Asia’s science-based farm
transformation. The Green Revolution has faltered,
before doing much for Africa’s main crops or for
areas with little or no “water control”—that is, with
neither irrigation nor farmer-managed methods to
vary the flow of rainwater to crops. International,
and African, public spending on plant breeding has
declined, and booming private investment in
biotech has sought mainly to cut costs for rich
farmers in rich countries. So Africa’s “demographic
gift”—its rising proportion of workers—does not yet
face the farm-led boom in income and employment
that East Asia’s did.
Globalization, accelerating from the 1980s,
“should have” enhanced the market and trade
prospects of poor people. Yet each unit of economic
growth, while still cutting dollar poverty after 1990,
has done so less than during 1970–90. Blame is
shared by (a) discrimination against rural areas by
governments of poor countries;
6 (b) the passive
attitude of many African governments to new crop
science and improved water control; (c) the
poisoning of developing-country farm incentives by
developed-country farm support (see page 18); (d)
the privatization of science, without appropriate
new incentives; and (e) the interaction of (c) and (d),
with incentives increasingly pointing farm science
towards the subsidized products of the European
and U.S. nonpoor. The last three factors are partly
due to political pressures from family farmers in
Europe and the United States (see page 19).
Ironically, these farmers—often poor relative to
norms in their own, wealthy, countries—are partly
responsible for the declining success in reducing
absolute poverty through progress by family
farmers in developing countries. To address these
five points, reorientation of crop and water science
is needed.
7
5 The World Bank (2004a, 11) estimates that in 2004 19 percent of the world’s 1.1 billion dollar-poor were in China (concen-
trated in the west). The United Nations (2003) estimates 30 percent in India (concentrated in eastern and central areas), a
further 10 percent elsewhere in South Asia, and 29 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa—over 60 percent of them in five big
countries, the first two of which are desperately poor: DR Congo, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda.
6 Though overt price extraction from agriculture is now much less than in the 1960s, public-expenditure bias against rural
infrastructure and institutions is probably worse (Eastwood and Lipton 2004).
7 There have been improvements, but more radicalism is needed, for example, moving public–private partnerships beyond
warm words—by motivating firms, via new profit incentives, to compete to attain public-purpose goals. 3
8 In the longer term, poor people gain, because dumping of Western food surpluses discourages domestic agrotechnical
progress in developing countries, which normally helps the poor by durably cutting food prices (for example, Pinstrup-Andersen,
de Londono, and Hoover 1976). Western dumping (which is unreliable and unpredictable) inhibits such progress even if it cuts
prices temporarily and once for all. However, in heavily staples-importing countries with little prospect of moving into staples
surplus, such once-for-all cuts may benefit the poor as staples consumers, via lower immediate food prices, but seldom enough
to outweigh the brake on domestic agricultural advance and so on later domestic food price cuts.
9 The dependency ratio (DR) is the number of persons aged under 15 or over 64, as a proportion of those aged 15–64 (the
prime working and saving age group). After 30 to 50 years, the falling DR is reversed—closing the window—because the
number of persons over 64 rises. 
The argument is set out as eleven bald propositions.
Evidence for them is provided in the next section.
1. Regardless of whether small or large farms
are more economic—usually the case in
developing and developed countries, 
respectively—family farms  have economic
advantages and therefore tend to dominate.
2. More than half the world’s dollar-poor will
reside in rural areas until about 2035, but big
gains for all main groups of dollar-poor—
smallholders, rural workers, and urban
poor—are compatible only with a special type
of farm productivity growth. Partly by luck, the
Green Revolution was of the right type.
3. Mass poverty can be slashed by farm-based
progress where three predisposing, perhaps
necessary, preconditions are met: on
technology, land/water use and distribution,
and farm incentives.
4. Formal science is increasingly needed to
satisfy the technology precondition.
5. However, the tasks and organization of pro-
poor farm science need radical reform,
especially for the crops and soil-water
regimes of rainfed Africa.
6. The land/water distribution precondition for
family farming to cut mass dollar poverty, met
in much of Green Revolution Asia, has not yet
been met in much of southern, and some of
eastern, Africa.
7. The land/water sustainability precondition is
threatened by crop expansion into marginal
lands.
8. Farm supports in Europe and the United
States—and recently in emerging Asian
countries like Japan and South Korea—have
cumulatively eroded the incentives for
developing-country agriculture by drastically
depressing farm prices and distorting world
farm science.
9. In rich countries, small-scale (and often
relatively poor) family farmers are a major
effective pressure towards farm supports,
which impede poverty reduction among the
absolute poor in poor countries—as family
farmers, farm workers, and usually as food
consumers.
8
10. Remedies are urgent, to take advantage of a
“window of opportunity” to slash poverty in
low-income countries: the effect of slower
population growth in sharply, but temporarily,
cutting dependency ratios.
9
11. The poor potentially gain from globalization,
but such gains are often reduced, and
sometimes turned into losses, by faulty institu-
tions that fail to connect the poor with
appropriate markets and information.
2. The Argument Outlined4
10 This is even more so if land is measured in quality-adjusted “efficiency units.” Even in Sub-Saharan Africa, few areas remain
where much land can be cheaply brought into cultivation without the costs, returns, and effect on ecological sustainability all
being much less favorable than on existing farmland.
11 Farms below 5 hectares in developed countries are normally considered part-time. As of 2000, over 75 percent of farms
were below 5 hectares in Italy and Portugal, but only 15 percent in Ireland and the United Kingdom. 
12 Where, in 1998–2000, own-account farmers and contributing family workers were counted separately from employers, they
often loomed large in the farm workforce: 87 percent in Poland, 80 percent in Austria, 77 percent in Portugal, 71 percent in
Lithuania, 57 percent in Latvia, 46 percent in Spain, 25 percent in Estonia, and 12 percent in the Czech Republic (ILO 2004).
1. Small farms tend to be more economic in
developing countries, while large farms are
more economic in developed countries;
nevertheless, in both cases family farms
have advantages that enable them, unless
prevented, to dominate.
Small farms have lower labor-related transaction
costs. They also have more family workers per
hectare, each motivated to work and each able to
find, screen, and supervise hired workers. Large
farms have lower capital- and land-related transac-
tion costs: owners can more readily finance
equipment and can use it over many hectares. So
small farms have advantages in early-developing
countries, which have low savings and therefore
capital per unskilled worker, and where prolonged
population growth has made land per person
scarce.
10 Conversely, large farms win out in
developed countries, with more savings, capital,
and (usually) good rural land per unit of unskilled
rural labor. Therefore, farms are generally smaller
in poor countries, and farm size normally rises with
economic development—though this is subject to
historical and political distortions via coercive
private or state action, such as colonial land grab
and subsequent counteractive land reforms
(Binswanger, Deininger, and Feder 1995;
Eastwood, Lipton, and Newell 2006, forthcoming).
Despite differing farm size and techniques,
family management dominates farming at all levels
of development. We can infer this from data on
farm size (FAO 2004b) and distribution of farm
labor force (ILO 2004). The rich-country facts in the
next paragraph may seem a digression, but they
are crucial for poor countries (see pages 19–20).
In Europe in 1990, national mean farm size was
typically 20–30 hectares (4.5 in Greece, 70.2 in the
United Kingdom), with one-third of farms below 5
hectares (typically occupying 5–10 percent of
farmland). Most farms below 30 hectares and almost
all below 5 hectares get most of their labor from the
farm family.
11 This is also the case for many much
larger farms, with the additional help of combines,
computers, and other hirable capital-intensive farm
services. In France, FAOSTAT data (FAO 2004b)
show mean farm size in 1988 at 31 hectares, with
73 percent of farms, on 92 percent of farmland,
above 5 hectares. Yet by 1994 only one in four
members of the farm workforce was an employee;
the rest were classified as employers or “own-
account” farmers (meaning those whose primary
occupation is farming their own or family land). By
1998–2000, of 13 European countries with data,
employees formed most of the agricultural workforce
only in Germany (51.5 percent) and Estonia (71.2
percent).
12 In North America, farms are typically
much larger, averaging 187 hectares in the United
3. The Argument UnpackedStates (1987) and 350 hectares in Canada
(1991), with barely 6 percent of holdings (0.1
percent of farmland) below 5 hectares.
13 By 2002,
only 2.6 percent of the U.S. workforce was agricul-
tural, 63 percent of them employees; probably most
U.S. farms use mainly family labor (USDA 2003).
What of developing countries? As of 2000, 40
percent of their farm workforce was located in
China, 21 percent in India, and 14 percent in Sub-
Saharan Africa (FAO 2004b). In China, since
1978–85, almost all farmland is distributed into
household-responsibility farms according to family
size. Astonishingly, despite mean farm size of only
0.67 hectares, 67 percent of the workforce
reported agriculture, largely family farming, as their
main occupation in 2000 (down from 78 percent in
1970). In India, the 1999–2000 proportion was
60 percent (compared with 74 percent in 1970),
but—in sharp contrast to China—rural Indian
households that reported agricultural labor as their
main income source were almost as numerous as
those reporting self-employment in agriculture (33
and 32 percent of the rural workforce, respectively
[Sundaram and Tendulkar 2002, 43]).
14 With
average farm size in 1990 of 1.55 hectares, only
24 percent of holdings above 2 hectares, and most
farm laborers getting significant income from own-
account farming (Singh 1991), rural India remains
family-farm country. The same can be said for
Bangladesh and, even more so, for Sub-Saharan
Africa, where land distribution is very unequal in
southern and some eastern areas; hired farm labor
is significant and increasing, yet small family
farming still dominates. In Ethiopia, with 80 percent
of its 27 million workers reporting agriculture as
their main activity in 2000, 42 percent of farm
workers were own-account farmers and 54 percent
were contributing family workers. Latin America
and southern Africa retain extreme “colonial” land
inequality, with agriculture dominated by larger, far
less labor-intensive farms than would be expected at
still-high national labor/capital ratios. Nevertheless,
in most countries, more people report farming than
farm labor as their main income source (a notable
exception is South Africa).
Consequently, though few countries publish
shares of employment, output, or holdings in family
farms as such (or define them officially), the above
data
15 suggest that—unlike virtually any other major
sector, even retailing—the economic advantages of
family oversight prevail in farming across a wide
range of development levels, typical farm sizes,
capital/land/labor ratios, and types of product and
ecology. Family and small-scale farming can be
ousted by force (colonial land grab, slavery, feudal
serfdom, ethnic cleansing, compelled collectiviza-
tion) or by governments or other sources of market
distortion that shift incentives strongly against small
family farms (for example, by making tenancy illegal
or unattractive). However, even against such sources
of needless distress, small-scale and family farming
has substantially raised its share of operated
farmland in Africa and Asia. There, for countries
having more than one Census of Agriculture from the
1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s rounds,
the average and median farm size and proportion
of farmland operated in holdings below 2 hectares
have, in almost every case, fallen (FAO 2004c;
Eastwood, Lipton, and Newell 2006, forthcoming).
This strongly suggests that such farms retain compet-
itive advantages despite market distortions, and
despite some genuine and growing market
handicaps as agricultural supply chains globalize
and concentrate (see page 22). 
5
13 Already in 1964, I saw (in Montana) farms of over 1,000 hectares with most of the work done by family members. This
applies also in Australia, with average farm size (pastoral plus arable) over 3,500 hectares. In Canada in 1998–2000, 3.1
percent of the workforce was agricultural—with fewer employees (45 percent) than employers and own-account farmers (50.2
percent). 
14 Yet for poor rural households the respective proportions were about half and a quarter. Farm laborers, not only in India, are
likelier to be poor—and more deeply poor—than those whose main income is from farming. This does not obviate small farms’
role in cutting poverty; for one thing, as farm size falls, even hired labor per hectare rises. 
15 These confirm the domination of farming by small units in most countries (including many developed ones), and the persistently
high ratio of employers, family workers, and self-employed to employees.Even in most developed agricultures, most
farms, hectares, and even production remain
family-managed, and farmers outnumber farm
laborers. Farm support payments, being propor-
tionate to output or area, are concentrated on a few
large farms;
16 yet farming in most rich countries
remains dominated by family farms (for example,
Baldwin and Wyplosz 2003, Ch.8). Though family
workers are usually leaving the land faster than
employers or laborers, family farm management
usually continues, with less labor (in terms of time)
and more capital per hectare. Economies of scale,
while genuine in OECD farming, cannot be very
great; otherwise, small farmer-owners would sell out
faster. Growing U.S. farm size has been consistent
with the continued dominance of family-farm over
corporate management (USDA 2003). In England,
from 1690 to 1831, though farmers were fewer
than farm laborers, the ratio—a fair indicator of
“farm familyness”—fell only slowly, from 0.5 to 0.4
(Mingay 1968, 25).
17 In Africa and Asia, mean
operated farm size has fallen with development,
which can only partly be attributed to falling owned
farmland per household (due to population growth
with partible inheritance—division of farms among
offspring—rising farm productivity, and land
reforms). This suggests that small family farms can
remain competitive and efficient well into early
development (though the situation will change as
development proceeds). Asian mean farm size will
eventually rise, but not necessarily the share of
nonfamily farms in land, work, or even output.
The evolution of the family farm is thus linked to
economic development, with its concomitant
poverty reduction and ever-wider exchange. There
are few subsistence farms left in the world. Almost
all family farms are commercial, profit-seeking
enterprises that buy some inputs and sell some
outputs; many grow export crops. The proportions
of farm inputs purchased rather than produced
(such as inorganic fertilizers rather than manure), of
outputs sold instead of consumed by the farm
household, and of farmers with secondary and
tertiary education all tend to rise with economic
development. Meanwhile, normally after the initial
increases in farm productivity, growth of the rural
population and workforce slows down.
18 Rising
ratios of capital to labor erode and eventually
reverse the net advantage of small farms, and labor
leaves the land. The farmers who choose to
continue are those more able, and willing, to
manage larger farms. Even in the highly developed
agricultures of the United States, family farms persist
as farm size rises: “The number of farms has fallen
dramatically since its peak in 1935. In the
meantime, the number of large farms has grown,
which means that large farms now form a larger
share of the total U.S. farms. Nevertheless, most of
the remaining farms are family-run businesses with
sales less than $250,000” (USDA 2003, Ch. 3).
The persistence and power of family farming
not only chart a credible course for evolving farmers
in Africa and Asia but also help explain the
Northern farm protectionism that makes their lives
so hard (see pages 20–21).
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16 However, the concentration of U.S. support on large corporate farms is less than the estimates suggest, since many such
farms are in fact cooperative arrangements supporting many, often small, family farms. The web sites for the much-listed “top
20 farm recipients” in the United States confirm this. 
17 In the United Kingdom as a whole, only in 1992 did farm employees come to outnumber farm employers and own-account
farmers (by 50.9 to 49.1 percent of farm workforce; ILO 2004).
18 Despite slower rural population growth, partible inheritance, alongside land reform, has reduced farmland owned or
controlled per household. In much of Asia, rising land productivity and growing rural nonfarm income have made these changes
compatible with rising rural incomes. But why has less land per household led to large decreases in operated farm size in most
of Africa and Asia since 1960 (Eastwood, Lipton, and Newell 2006, forthcoming)? Imperfect rental, sales, and other land-
transfer markets and arrangements are unconvincing as a full answer. At the very least, the data are inconsistent with the view
that small farms are, or are yet becoming, uncompetitive or inefficient in most of Africa or Asia.2. In countries with mass dollar poverty,
70 percent of it is rural. Significant gains
for the main groups of dollar-poor (small
farmers, rural laborers, and urban poor)
almost always initially require a special
type of growth in family farm productivity,
which—partly by luck—the Green Revolu-
tion was able to provide.
Of the world’s dollar-poor, 70 percent are rural, and
the projection for 2035 is 50 percent (Ravallion
2002). Further, rural shares of poverty intensity are
substantially higher;
19 and in Africa and Asia poverty
is even more rurally concentrated.
The dollar-poor derive almost all their income
from employment (hired or self-employed), 45–60
percent of it in agriculture, and devote well over
half their consumption to staple foods.
20 To initiate
major cuts in mass dollar poverty, a country
normally needs higher employment, higher
unskilled wage-rates, and/or more command over
low-cost food staples. Productivity growth in small
family farming alone usually has the potential to
raise all three, at low capital costs per workplace.
Normally this later permits, and induces, further
poverty reduction via cash-cropping, rural nonfarm
work, and shifts to urban employment and income
growth. But mass dollar poverty reduction almost
always  starts with (a) large, widely shared
increases in profitably produced (including self-
consumed) farm output—especially food staples,
and (b) profitably sought and offered farm employ-
ment (including self-employment), mainly on family
farms.
21 Especially as land gets scarcer, that
requires a technology-based agricultural revolution.
But even if that works, stringent conditions must be
met (the “two tightropes,” discussed below) for all
the main dollar-poverty groups—small farmers,
rural laborers, the urban poor—to benefit from new
farm technology.
Before developing this argument, it helps to set
out an economist’s paradigm of the evolution of farm
size and ownership, and their interplay with poverty,
farm science, and globalization (alongside domestic
market enlargement). In pre-modern development,
there were few people per hectare of land. Most
land was of a fairly uniform quality and could be
made arable by applying labor (for example,
through land leveling or slash-and-burn). At that
stage, land scarcity hardly affected farm size.
Farmland was free or cheap and was often not
defined as property. In more egalitarian societies,
farm size depended on what could be cleared and
managed by a family or kinship unit. In more author-
itarian societies, farm size depended on how much
land-associated labor could be managed or
compelled by a feudal lord, slaver, chief, or boss. In
this initial era of farming, before sustained popula-
tion growth and pressure (an era that lasted from the
Neolithic settlement until perhaps 500 B.C. in parts
of Asia, but well into the last century in parts of
Africa and Latin America), there was little call for
yield-enhancing crop science. On-farm crop
development by seed selection happened, as did
much learning about nutrient and water manage-
ment. The pace was probably not fast, however; for
all but a tiny elite, rural poverty remained the natural
and inescapable order of life.
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19 Intensity of dollar poverty in a region is incidence (proportion of people consuming below $1 per day) times depth (their
mean proportionate shortfall below $1); poverty is deeper in rural areas (Eastwood and Lipton 2004). 
20 Staples (cereals, starchy roots, bananas, and plantains) constituted just under 70 percent of calorie intake in developing
countries in 2000 (FAO 2004a). In low-income countries proportions are higher (78 percent in Mozambique, 72 percent in
China, and 69 percent in India and Nigeria during 1996–98), and among the rural poor highest of all (IFAD 2001, 23).
Household consumption surveys typically show that, in the consumption budget for persons below a dollar-per-day PPP poverty
line, at least 65–70 percent is food, and 50 percent is staples alone—both slightly more in rural than in urban areas (Deaton
1997; Lipton 1983).
21 Some poverty reduction is feasible through productivity gains even on small, food-deficit farms. However, in much of southern
and eastern Africa, land distribution remains very  unequal, mass poverty persists, and significant farm sales are confined to
10–15 percent of farms (Jayne et al. 2003). In such conditions, for rapid poverty reduction, land redistribution is often needed,
as well as employment-intensive agrotechnical progress.The age of ample land presumably ended for
most of Asia’s agricultural population by 500
B.C.–A.D. 100, calling forth a series of “blue revolu-
tions” in water technology, spreading irrigation in
the Yellow River and Yangtze basins, Mesopotamia,
Egypt, much of India, and Sri Lanka (Bray 1986).
Wittfogel (1957) implies that growing, organizable
populations made authoritarian, nonfamily organi-
zation of farming and water politically sustainable.
Boserup (1965) hypothesizes that widespread,
organized agrotechnical change—whether Asia’s
blue revolution, the transition from slash-and-burn to
organized land shaping and shortening fallows in
Africa, or Asia’s Green Revolution—is seldom
exogenous (for example, due to spontaneously
discovered or imported new technology) but is
usually induced by rising labor–land ratios. Such
rising ratios, and induced land and water scarcities,
mean that almost everywhere, including Africa,
yield enhancement has become more important
than higher labor productivity in inducing farm-
based poverty reduction.
22 As in Asia’s Green
Revolution, so in Africa: to raise entitlements for all
groups of rural poor, labor productivity has to rise,
but land (and in some places and at some times
water) productivity has to rise faster.
A minority of the dollar-poor reside in urban
areas, but for them also, farm output growth cuts
poverty. It raises the supply of staples, keeping prices
down. Small family-farm growth, in particular,
restrains urban migration of unskilled labor and thus
helps keep urban wage-rates rising and unemploy-
ment low. Strong evidence exists, both from national
cross-section and single-country time-series data, that
farm growth does more than nonfarm growth to
reduce poverty—even urban poverty—except
perhaps in Latin America, which has extreme land
inequality and large areas of nonfamily farms
(Thirtle, Lin, and Piesse 2003; Eastwood and Lipton
2000). As for the rural majority of the dollar-poor,
most receive their primary income from family
farming or labor on other family farms, and most
who escaped poverty in early development did so
via science-based, employment-intensive, family-
farm income growth. Further, science-based small
farm growth is the main motor for increasing income
sources for those rural dollar-poor who do not derive
their livelihood from family farms (most farm laborers
plus the rural nonfarm poor). The rural poor get
significant and rising proportions of income from
hired farm labor (see page 5 and footnote 14);
however, not only family but also hired labor per
hectare is usually higher on smaller and family farms
(IFAD 2001). Rural nonfarm activity, especially
construction, trade, and transport, also contributes
substantially and increasingly to rural income,
including that of the dollar-poor (Reardon et al.
1998), and most rural nonfarm income depends on
demand by family farmers.
23
Given that most of the world’s poor depend on
small family farms, the following seems logical:
poverty plagues small family farms, so enrich them
through crop science. But why reject an alternative:
small-scale family farming means poverty, so get the
poor out of farming? After all, once mass rural
poverty starts to recede, most of the remaining poor
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22 Africa is often seen as a continent of ample land and scarce labor. This was true 50 years ago, and there are still areas
where smallholders leave arable land unfarmed because they lack enough labor to break, prepare, and weed it all. But this
has come to apply to ever fewer regions. Most areas, with long-continuing and ongoing rural population growth but few gains
in land productivity, have arrived at or close to the “extensive margin.” New land can be farmed only at sharply rising break-
in costs and environmental fragility, yet sharply falling net annual returns. To turn rural unemployment, low productivity, and low
wages into labor shortages because technical progress bids up the demand for labor is the essence of both rural development
and poverty reduction. Temporary, local, and anti-developmental labor shortages are of course part of the disaster of HIV/AIDS;
however, were these to induce long-term labor-displacing and hence wage-reducing investments or policies, the disaster would
be compounded.
23 In some rural situations, many rural poor rely on remittances from family members who have moved to towns. Usually this is
the migration of hope, rising sharply only after farm growth and some capital-intensification. However, mass rural dependence
on remittances signifies the migration of despair if it is because smallholdings are unrewarding for lack of adequate shares in
land, water, or technical progress (for example, South Africa). Such migration depresses urban wage-rates and denudes rural
areas of innovators; hence, while it may briefly relieve extreme need, it seldom cuts chronic poverty.(and nonpoor) come to require expanded nonfarm
income for further gains. Yet the developing
world—while spangled with successes of family-
farm- and science-led mass poverty reduction,
followed by rural and then urban industrialization—
is littered with failures of premature industrialization.
The associated capital cost per workplace, given
that the poor initially depend on work for extra
income, is just too high. Except in a handful of
entrepôt city-states (for example, Singapore) and
mineral economies unusually successful both in
responding to their poor and in managing their
economic surpluses (for example, Botswana), there
are virtually no examples of mass dollar poverty
reduction since 1700 that did not start with sharp
rises in employment and self-employment income due
to higher productivity in small family farms. This is not
driven by mass rural emigration (leaving behind
more farmland, and hence income-earning work, per
person); that happens later (see footnote 23).
For reasons long understood (Johnston and
Mellor 1961; Johnston and Kilby 1975; Mellor
1976), it is wishful thinking to expect industrializa-
tion in the mass poverty heartlands before—indeed
without—productivity growth on family farms. Such
hopes are still common among elites both in
developing countries and in donor agencies, and
this helps to explain the collapse of aid to agricul-
ture.
24 Yet, as illustrated in Asia since 1960 (and
indeed in Europe during 1740–1900), urban
industry develops a substantial role in employment
generation, and hence poverty reduction, only after
successful agriculture-led development. Rural
nonfarm growth does offer substantial early
prospects for improved employment and income for
the dollar-poor (Reardon et al. 1998), but this
normally results from demand through growth
linkages. Rising farm income drives demand for
extra farm inputs and for processing of extra farm
outputs; above all, extra farm income produces
consumption linkages to local construction, trade,
and transport. Such demand-led, employment-
intensive poverty reduction normally comes from
initial productivity and income growth on nearby
small family farms; large farmers, on the other
hand, tend to devote more of their extra income to
less employment-intensive urban commodities, and
to imports (Hazell and Ramasamy 1991).
25
Conversely, supply-led mass poverty reduction
by the nonfarm sector prior to employment-intensive
technical progress on smallholder farms has usually
proved to be a dead end, characterized by (a) once-
for-all exploitation of mines or quarries; (b)
state-driven capital-intensive, and ultimately unafford-
able, industrialization; or (c) distress diversification
into other rural nonfarm sectors (where it pushes
down wage-rates), driven not by higher local farm-
based demand but by underused workers in
stagnant agriculture as the population grows.
Nonfarm expansion, especially as a cure for rural
poverty, is normally a consequence of—not an
alternative to—family-farm, employment-intensive
development and expansion. China exemplifies this
in extreme form. In 1959–63, disastrous famines
followed forced, but failed, industrialization based
on surplus extraction from collective farms without
rapid farm growth. This contrasts with China’s
dramatic successes in cutting poverty in recent
decades. This happened via rapid farm growth 
in 1977–84, as egalitarian decollectivization
9
24 For agriculture, including forestry and fisheries, the proportion of sectorally allocable aid disbursed fell from 20.2 percent
in 1987–89 to 12.5 percent in 1996–98 (IFAD 2001, 41). The proportion of OECD bilateral aid disbursed to agriculture fell
from 12.4 percent in 1982–83 to 3.7 percent in 2002–03 (OECD 2004). Total aid disbursed to agriculture in 1990 prices
fell from US$9.2 billion in 1980–84 (17 percent of all aid) to $3.9 billion (6 percent) in 2000 (OECD 2001). And total aid
committed to agriculture under FAO’s “broad” definition fell from 16.3 to 9.1 percent of aid in 1988–99, and, under the
“narrow” definition, from 9.1 to 4.5 percent (OECD 2003).
25 Farms of thousands of hectares and with scores, sometimes hundreds, of hired workers exist in Latin America and southern
Africa, where great land inequality turns many rural poor into an almost landless “proletariat.” Elsewhere this is rare. In most
of Asia and Africa, large-scale farmers typically farm 10–30 hectares. Though hiring a larger proportion of labor than do small
farmers, they too are usually family farmers; the family provides 40–70 percent of the farm’s labor. As stated, however, larger
farmers’ income is less likely to be spent on rural nonfarm output.  accompanied less extractive farm prices, continued
successful crop science, and better irrigation. Rural
poverty fell again in the 1990s, as farm success was
followed by rural industrialization through township
and village enterprises, and by somewhat relaxed
restraints on migration. 
A careful, updated estimate of global trends in
dollar poverty since the 1980s shows the crucial role
of agricultural growth in early mass poverty
reduction: “China’s incidence of [dollar] poverty
was roughly twice that for the rest of the developing
world [in 1981]; by the mid-1990s, [it] had fallen
well below average. There were 400 million fewer
people living on under $1 per day in China in 2001
than 20 years earlier, though a staggering half of
this decline was in [1981–84], probably due to . . .
China’s [agricultural] reforms starting in the late
1970s” (Chen and Ravallion 2004, 15). However,
without massive prior investment in irrigation
improvement, agricultural research, and rural
infrastructure, decollectivization alone could not
have produced China’s huge, employment-
enhancing and poverty-reducing rises in staples
output. At some 6 percent per year in 1977–85, this
staples growth rise was far faster than in subsequent
periods, in which China enjoyed much slower
poverty reduction.
26 Results for India, Indonesia, and
elsewhere (as well as cross-national estimates)
confirm that growth is far more pro-poor in “mass
poverty” countries when it is mainly in agricultural
rather than other output and income. The link is
weaker, however, where farmland is highly unequal,
so that large parts of farmland and agricultural
growth are not in labor-intensive smallholdings
(Eastwood and Lipton 2000).
A possible objection is that—even if accelerated
and normally science-driven farm growth is
necessary to initiate mass poverty reduction—it may
not be feasible or sufficient to overcome binding land
and water constraints. Feasibility depends on (a)
availability, quality, and distribution of farmland (and
water); (b) crop, land, and water science; and (c)
prospects for national and global trade and
exchange, and their effects on farm sales and prices.
Suppose all these, including the science, are
feasible. Further, suppose we—like the architects of
the Green Revolution—see the task of initial mass
poverty reduction as winning a “growth race”
between population and the pile of food staples,
and in fact do win that race. Even that will not
suffice for mass poverty reduction without a
corresponding rise in the poor’s command over
staple foods (or food “entitlements” [Sen 1981]).
Even large increases in staple food productivity
would do little to cut mass dollar poverty if they
were confined to large-scale farms, using tractors
and combines but few workers, and selling at
government-boosted prices that the underemployed
and near-landless poor cannot afford. Not just the
world as a whole but even India and some other
developing countries have large grain stores but at
the same time mass hunger, because income levels
among poor people—whether from employment or
self-employment—are too low to provide them with
sufficient market entitlements to staples.
Brilliant as it was, the Green Revolution was
also lucky in the sense that while it aimed at
increasing the availability of staples (“the pile of
rice”) it also happened to achieve higher income-
based entitlements to staples for the poor. The early
rice and wheat semidwarfs mainly suited nonpoor
farmers in initially well-watered and productive
areas, but successor varieties proved increasingly
amenable to small, poor, employment-intensive
family farmers in large areas of Asia and Latin
America, some unirrigated (Lipton with Longhurst
1989; Smith and Urey 2002). Hence, in many
areas, the Green Revolution raised not only the
supply of locally available staples but also, in the
same process, the demand for farm labor, wage-
rates, and thus the work-based income of the
dollar-poor, both among small family farmers and
(often even more [Hazell and Ramasamy 1991])
among farm laborers. The lesson for future crop
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26 However, there was “a further drop of 120 million in the poverty count between 1993 and 1996 [probably due to] the
substantial, but short-lived, increase in 1994 in the procurement price for foodgrains paid by the government” (Chen and
Ravallion 2004, 17–18).   science policy is clear. When choosing among
research paths, a high employment share in extra
science-induced farm income should normally be
seen as a gain.
27 For countries where the dollar-
poor lose out if the demand for farm labor declines,
aid-backed farm research should not support better
combines, herbicides, and mechanical trans-
planters—or varieties whose advantages depend
on these—unless the results can be shown to be
cost-effective ways to cut poverty.
The Green Revolution’s good luck was not
limited to success in raising income-based entitle-
ments, though its goal was to raise food availability.
If the Green Revolution (where its widespread use
was feasible) were to benefit all main groups of
dollar-poor, it had—without being planned that
way—to walk two tightropes. The three main
groups of dollar-poor families depend for income
mainly on small farms, hired farm labor, or nonfarm
(including urban) economic activity. To improve
welfare for all three of the major dollar-poor groups,
advances in applied farm science must satisfy two
conditions:
1. The Price/Total-Productivity Tightrope
For new science to help poor farmers and
poor food consumers (a lot), it must cut staples
prices (a lot), but must raise total factor
productivity (TFP) on small farms (a lot)
faster.
28 New science usually raises farm
supply of outputs and demand for inputs. That
makes outputs cheaper and inputs more
expensive; hence the ratio of farm output
prices to input prices falls.
29 Do small and
poor farmers gain? If, and only if, this science-
induced fall in their relative farm prices is
slower than the science-induced rise in their
conversion ratio of physical inputs into
physical outputs (that is, TFP).
30 Yet, unless the
extra food brings the price of staples down,
the nonfarm poor, especially in towns,
31 may
not gain much from new crop science. 
Walking this tightrope successfully means
addressing two demand issues: (a) Is there
enough demand for extra staples produced
by agricultural research to avert price
declines that would unduly cut research gains
to small farmers? and (b) How can the poor
afford this extra food? It is easier to walk this
tightrope if many of the research adopters are
food-deficit small farmers. These, a substantial
majority of the rural poor in most of Africa
and Asia, spend significant portions of their
extra income on more (and better) staples,
eating much of the extra food themselves.
32
2.  The Wage Rate/Labor–Land/Productivity
Tightrope 
In the early stages of development out of
mass poverty, for new science to help poor
farm laborers (a lot), it must raise output per
labor-hour (a lot) but output per hectare (a lot)
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27 Peak-season labor needs and HIV/AIDS do not justify farm science that cuts demand for labor (see page 12).
28 Meeting the condition is one escape from the agricultural treadmill. The case is clear if farmers grow only food staples. If
they can shift to cash crops, new staple-crop science can cut staples prices somewhat more sharply than it raises staples TFP,
yet help poor farmers if they can then profitably shift some land into cash crops. 
29 Globalization means that farm prices are increasingly determined on a world scale, but transport costs (especially in Africa
and for staples), and remaining state price interventions, remain high enough that a country’s domestic farm output changes
(and the research affecting them) still have a major impact on national prices. 
30 The condition is somewhat modified for staples produced by dollar-poor farmers who eat almost all they grow. 
31 Some rural nonfarm poor can gain from higher demand for local nonfarm products (especially construction, retailing, and
transport) by farmers as their poverty recedes.
32 How can a deficit or subsistence farmer buy more inputs, even if research makes them profitable? The answer, in part, is the
counter-effect of the farmer needing less money for staples because research raises the productivity of growing rather than
buying them. Deficit farmers normally get much of their income from nonfarm activities or remittances, which can be diverted
from staples purchases to buying new inputs. However, there is a credit problem in the early years of input-driven productivity
growth.more. In a substantial and increasing
majority of farming situations in developing
countries, there is hardly any “spare”
farmland worth cultivating.
33 With A (area of
cropland) fixed, L (use of farm labor) can rise
only if output per unit of area (Q/A) grows
faster than output per unit of farm labor
(Q/L): hence the above condition for total
demand for farm labor to rise, pulling up
employment or the wage-rate. 
The condition is tighter if supply of farm
labor grows. The number of persons of prime
working age (15–64 years old) is set to rise
at around 2 percent per year in most of South
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa for the next
10–20 years, and by over 1 percent even in
rural areas. For farming to help raise
demand for labor faster than supply, with
cropland scarce, scientific advances must
raise output per hectare by at least, say, 1.5
percent per year faster than output per
worker.
This is not to say that agricultural research in
poor areas can disregard output per worker. It too
must rise significantly. First, its desperately low level
is what makes poverty heartlands that way.
Second, they are also kept poor by low labor
productivity, which deters farmers and others from
hiring more labor, thus retarding the poor’s wages,
employment, and bargaining power. Third, higher
labor productivity is especially important in areas
facing acute seasonal labor scarcity—most
common in Africa, particularly when hoeing is
needed; otherwise, severe yield losses can occur
due to late planting. Such conditions are partly due
to lack of water control and robust crop varieties
that can withstand moderately late or scarce rains.
34
Fourth, HIV/AIDS severely depresses local labor
supply in parts of Africa. Research needs to raise
labor productivity, especially in peaks, but it cannot
help those afflicted by HIV/AIDS to cut the demand
for poor people’s labor! Agricultural research, with
land and water limited, will seldom cut poverty
much without raising their productivity faster than
labor productivity. Otherwise, farm employment
demand must fall. Only much further into the
process of development and rural poverty
reduction, when nonfarm growth and emigration
have pulled wage-rates up, should researchers—
like farmers—seek to raise labor productivity faster
than land productivity. 
That the Green Revolution, after a faltering
start, came to meet the needs of the poorest was not
wholly luck. Early critics—and farmers—stressed
the need for more robust varieties, to reach both
“difficult” regions and risk-averse poor farmers.
Public-sector, public-purpose researchers addressed
these criticisms (Lipton with Longhurst 1989), where
private counterparts would have been pressed to
focus on better-off, more secure customers.
35
However, brilliant as the science was, it was also
lucky that the Green Revolution semidwarfs proved
so amenable to crossing for better resistance to
main pests and diseases and, further, that succes-
sive semidwarf varieties walked the two tightropes.
Small, dollar-poor farmers found that the new seeds
allowed them to turn their few resources into much
more output of staple food. TFP far outpaced the fall
in staples prices relative to the prices of inputs.
36
Dollar-poor farm workers found that larger harvests,
more water control, and more fertilizer use all
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33 See footnote 22. The argument also applies to water productivity, in the rising proportion of farm situations where the water
constraint is biting or intensifying.
34 In such areas research might aim to raise labor productivity at the peaks but land productivity in the slack season.  
35 The biotech revolution is much more private-sector based, and its critics are more fundamentalist. Much institutional and
incentive work is needed if biotech is to “re-run” the Green Revolution’s adaptability to poor farmers’ needs.
36 Major steps were taken in East Asia, in the 1970s, and South Asia, in the 1980s, to make competitive credit available to
some small farmers and to reduce extraction via parastatal and trade-based manipulation by governments of output and input
prices. Speeding the much slower steps in this direction in Africa is a major part of the few recent successes in spreading
science-based agricultural progress there.raised their productivity somewhat—but the produc-
tivity of scarce land much more. Therefore, the
demand for their labor rose significantly, while their
staples requirements became cheaper. The urban,
and rural nonfarm, dollar-poor gained from the
restraining effect of the extra staples output,
generated by the Green Revolution, on the price of
food staples. So all three groups of dollar-poor saw
their entitlements to food staples—typically
absorbing over half their incomes—substantially
raised by the Green Revolution.
Moreover, especially in its later years
(1975–85), the Green Revolution reduced the year-
to-year instability of food entitlements. More pest-
and disease-resistant seeds, constantly adapted by
researchers to resist new plant biotypes, reduced
year-to-year variability of farm output and, as a
result, of demand for farm laborers. That also
reduced price fluctuations for consumers (as well as
producers), as did the larger levels of public and
private stocks made possible by output increases.
Seasonal variability also declined to some extent,
because the new seeds were increasingly able to
produce short-duration or multiple crops in some
conditions. 
Finally, the Green Revolution in Asia, from
about 1975–80, increasingly spread into hitherto
untouched regions, raising and stabilizing entitle-
ments there also for the dollar-poor as small
farmers, farm laborers, and urban employees.
Researchers generated results for water environ-
ments less ideal than the irrigated deltaic and canal
flatlands that benefited in 1964–75. Today, in both
China and India, the return to crop science is higher
in many “backward” regions, where many dollar-
poor remain, than in the lead areas of the Green
Revolution, where dollar poverty has fallen much
more sharply (Fan, Hazell, and Thorat 2000; Fan,
Linxiu, and Zhang 2000).
3. Mass poverty can be slashed by farm-
based progress given three predisposing,
perhaps necessary, preconditions: on
technology, land/water use and distribu-
tion, and farm incentives. 
We should be cautious about long lists of prerequi-
sites for small-farm growth. Such lists induce undue
pessimism and inhibit action. Widescale pro-poor
progress based on crop science for small family
farms does not initially need good roads, credit,
extension, and so on, helpful though they are.
Indeed, more of them (as Asian experience shows)
are effectively demanded by farmers in the political
and economic marketplaces, after crop science
raises yield and profitability sharply.
37 However, the
following preconditions are almost always essential:
1.  Farm TFP growth via locally profitable, and
(usually) employment-intensive, technology
normally requiring better seeds, some water
control, and agronomy; often, irrigation,
better pest control, and more fertilizers; but
seldom tractors or herbicides, unless farmland
expansion is constrained by lack of plowing
or weeding labor, as is the case in a few
places in West Africa (see arguments 4–5).
2. Not-too-unequal land and water, sustainably
used (see arguments 6–7).
3. Farm production patterns that are not too
vulnerable to disabling of incentives by
domestic or overseas policies that sharply
erode or distort farm prices; unshiftable initial
conditions, such as imposed gross land
inequality; or inbuilt adverse trends, such as
poor farmers or workers not just producing but
being locked into commodities where science-
induced progress induces more-than-offsetting
price erosion—for example, tea, coffee,
cocoa, and oilpalm (see arguments 8–9).
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37 Especially if farmland is very unequal, the farmers who get new technology first, and press for better input and output
markets, will concentrate on improvements other than those most important for poor farmers. For poor farmers to share fully in
new market prospects following technical progress, public policy interventions are usually needed. Can these preconditions be met? Three sorts of
things can help or hinder. Most important are
policies and laws affecting institutions of, and
support and incentives for, crop and water science,
land reform and land use, and globalization.
Second is demographics, specially the evolving
ratio of workers to dependents (see argument 10,
pages 20–21). Third—and often adaptable if the
other two are right—is local agroecology and initial
infrastructure (including markets) in each of the
remaining poverty heartlands.
4. Formal science is increasingly needed to
satisfy the technology precondition.
During the millennia, without sharp secular popula-
tion growth, local farm technologies almost
everywhere improved by informal, farmer-to-farmer
and area-to-area spread of experiment and innova-
tion. This worked even after “revolutionary”
changes in the concepts behind local farm technolo-
gies: the Neolithic, medieval, and early modern
agricultural revolutions (Lipton with Longhurst
1989). Even in recent centuries, farmers’ innovation
usually sufficed to keep pace with population while
it grew at up to 1 percent yearly (for example, in
Kano, Nigeria [Hill 1977]). However, in the
population acceleration of 1730–2000 (and as
unfarmed, quality land became scarce), poverty
reduction increasingly required TFP-increasing
technical progress to be faster, more yield-
enhancing, and employment-intensive. To achieve
this, farm-based innovation remained necessary,
complementing (but increasingly elbowed out by)
formal, off-farm science. The content of science also
changed. Better natural resource management
(NRM)
38 continues to be important, but less so
relative to formal inputs—and increasingly induced
(made more profitable for farmers) by such inputs
rather than introduced by supply-led NRM innova-
tion, extension, or even research.
39 From 1730 in
Europe, and most dramatically since the early
1960s in Asia, it was increasingly formal, science-
based water control, inorganic fertilizers, and plant
breeding that allowed TFP improvements to outpace
population growth and land/water depletion. 
While good farm research always hears
farmers’ voices and builds on their experiments, it is
not just client-induced or demand-driven. Whether it
has something to deliver to poor farmers, farm
workers, and staples consumers depends also on
prior development of basic science and incentives
to applied science. As for science, Mendelian
genetics supplied a basic model for applied Green
Revolution breeding; as for incentives, though
private profitability induced mainly labor-saving
research (Binswanger and Ruttan, eds. 1977),
public-purpose, not-for-profit finance encouraged
scientists to realize the Green Revolution model,
and hence to attack poverty.
40 Major yield enhance-
ment almost always required more nitrogen
fertilizer (N-fertilizer). However, farmers will not
apply much of this if it is likely to make the plant fall
over. Therefore, breeders produced short-strawed
varieties of rice and wheat, to which much more N-
fertilizer could profitably be applied (and with a
higher harvest index). From the late 1960s, the
emphasis moved increasingly to further applications
of Mendelian genetics (with plant pathology,
entomology, and so on) to immunize successive
14
38 NRM is farmer-led agronomic control of nutrients, water, and biota (for example, organic manuring, valley-bottom micro-
irrigation, terracing, crop rotation and mixing, and removal of insect egg masses). 
39 Though the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) has shifted substantial resources from plant
breeding to NRM since the early 1980s, evidence of a high rate of return is much clearer for breeding than for NRM, other
than integrated pest management (World Bank 2004a). 
40 A commentator points out that similar public research drove much progress in farming in 19th-century developing countries,
for example, Liebig’s work on agrochemicals led to modern fertilizers. Also, well before Darwin or Mendel, public botanical
gardens led to systematic plant selection and breeding; more recently U.S. land-grant universities were a model for crucial work
in India and elsewhere. The commentator traces current inattention to such history—and acceptance of the much lower ratio of
research outlay to farm output in today’s developing countries—to “excessive faith in [cross-border and cross-ecology research]
spillovers, and Thatcherite ideas of the role of the private sector” (personal communication with author). new varieties against successive new pest biotypes
(though with less success against abiotic stresses),
and to spread them into some less favorable
environments. 
The Green Revolution has slowed sharply, as
has yield growth, since the 1980s (Lipton 1999;
IFAD 2001; FAO 2004b), without doing much for
scores of millions of small family farms with little
water control, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa.
There, 3 to 4 percent of cropland is irrigated (as
against about 40 percent in South and East Asia).
In the field, leading varieties and landraces of the
main African staples (white maize, millet, sorghum,
cassava, and yams) are probably low-yielding
because evolutionary reward (and farmer selection)
over many generations has gone less to high-
yielding varieties than to varieties—and indeed
crops—able to tolerate low nutrient inputs, severe
and variable moisture stress, and locally dominant
pests (from quelea to striga) that have received less
attention from plant breeders or other researchers
than have insects, fungi, and viruses.
41
5. The tasks and organization of farm
science need radical reform to improve
pro-poor results, especially for the crops
and soil-water regimes of rainfed Africa.
Can new crop science fill the gaps in less-favored
areas? The Green Revolution could not escape the
law of diminishing returns. The best areas were
covered first, and the low-hanging fruit of scientific
advance plucked first: what is left usually
42 yields
less. Despite success in parts of rainfed Asia and
some of Africa (mostly maize hybrids), past evidence
suggests severe limitations on conventional plant
breeding. Not only has this slowed down sharply
but also most of its recent successes seem relevant
mainly to water-controlled areas (for example, the
“new plant type” of rice). Further, some features of
Green Revolution farming slow down, or even
reverse, yield growth: water-table lowering via ever-
deeper competing tubewells; micronutrient
depletion; monocultures reducing biodiversity yet
stimulating low-level buildup of new pest biotypes;
43
and restrictive responses to overconcentration of
pesticide residues, and fertilizer-derived nitrates and
nitrites, in water sources shared by humans and
plants. Yet returns to staples breeding are high and
have not fallen since the 1970s (Alston et al. 2000).
This is consistent with the slowing growth of staples
yields, but the two together imply that research
based on the Mendelian breakthrough has increas-
ingly had to focus on maintaining yields rather than
raising them.
More promisingly, the basic-science break-
through by Crick, Watson, and others in 1954 is
now feeding into a key complement to conventional
plant breeding: transgenics. In principle, this permits
the identification—and insertion into African crops
hitherto evolved or selected for characteristics
competitive with yield—of yield-favoring DNA
sequences from other plants (or other life-forms).
Unlike the Green Revolution, however, research in
applied biotechnology is largely owned, exploited,
and motivated privately. Private firms must recover
costs plus profit from farmers. That explains the
concentration of transgenics on open-pollinated
crops (and a few F1 hybrids of self-pollinators),
large and visible farmers, crops and traits preferred
15
41 For many African situations, it is claimed that good improved cultivars are available, yet farm-to-station yield gaps huge
(anecdotal evidence claims 90 percent for maize in Malawi). The famous Herdt–International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) Asian
gap studies may, however, suggest that in Africa too, since farmers are no fools, economic yield gaps are much smaller and
the new varieties much less suited to actual field conditions than claimed.   
42 Some areas, however, were agriculturally backward because they were neglected by applied science, not recalcitrant to it.
In both China and India, some “backward” areas now offer more growth, and more poverty reduction, per extra dollar of crop
research than do the conventional lead areas (Fan, Hazell, and Thorat 2000; Fan, Linxiu, and Zhang 2000). 
43 Breeders have largely kept ahead of new epidemics (though there have been nasty shocks—for example, with rice, the
tungro epidemic [1972] and new biotypes of brown planthopper). However, a few adapted pests, each causing small but
significant crop losses, probably explain part of the fall in yields, with controlled water and nutrients, in IRRI research fields and
in farmers’ fields in the Indian Punjab.by wealthier consumers, and in general the (so far)
not very poor-friendly priorities of most plant
biotech. Herbicide resistance, valuably labor-saving
in rich and labor-scarce developed rural areas, is
likely to be poverty-increasing where weeding is
mostly done by laborers who, if displaced, cannot
readily find other work at comparable wage-rates.
Bt-based resistance (for example, to corn borer and
bollworm), while surprisingly stable so far, remains
vertical, and thus high-risk for small farmers without
ready emergency access to alternatives if the pest
develops a new biotype. The main staples grown
and eaten by the world’s poor (including white
maize)
44 have largely remained “Cinderellas” of
transgenics research, though China, where this
research is largely public-sector, may create major
exceptions. Can new basic science, organized and
applied as crop and field technology, serve poverty-
reduction goals and complement conventional plant
breeding and noncrop farm science to focus on
yield enhancement and robustness promotion for
main staples in rainfed areas? There are institutional
and scientific issues.
Institutionally, the organization of crop science
needs to be adapted to eradicating poverty among
many poor family farmers. In the early Green
Revolution, international agricultural research
centers, and national centers in many Asian and
Latin American developing countries, delivered a
steady stream of high-yielding and pest-adapted
varieties of rice, wheat, and maize, mainly for
water-reliable areas, but raising incomes of poor
farmers, laborers, and food consumers. But after
1980 public-purpose farm research funding fell
(except in parts of Asia), was tied ever more tightly
to shifting donor priorities in ways that inhibited
planning by researchers, and was diverted by
donors away from crop improvement towards a
series of less productive, and sometimes fashion-
driven, aims (World Bank 2004a). As for applied
biotechnology, perhaps 90 percent of work is now
in a few big companies, which naturally protect
their research, including plant varieties. Since
2000, there have been improvements: moves to re-
focus the Consultative Group for International
Agricultural Research (CGIAR) and to reverse the
long fall in well-targeted resources for public plant
breeding; talk (and some action) on public–private
partnerships; and generous, if marginal, poverty-
related uses of a few percent of their resources by
big biotech companies. However, if private
transgenics is to complement public purposes and
to address the needs of the poor, a much more
radical approach is needed. Private companies
need to see public-purpose research outcomes as
made profitable, not mainly by private royalties
from farmers or by PR spin-off, but by contracts to
achieve specific outcomes that will raise family-farm
productivity or robustness, especially for staples, in
neglected areas and crops. One of many possible
contracts might require development of maize
hybrid or composite populations, viable and
profitable over stated areas (with known pest
populations) in Africa, meeting targets for (a)
capacity to resist delayed rainfall (latency) at the
time of anther formation, (b) yield, and (c) field
spread to small farms. Such contracts should be
competitively awarded; engage, and perhaps be
designed by, public agricultural research institu-
tions, jointly with end-users; focus on applicability in
low-income countries committed to genuinely
additional research cofinancing; but otherwise be
mainly financed by aid. Present alternatives are
unpromising.
45
As an economist I have no locus standi to
assess natural-science (rather than institutional or
economic) priorities. There is recent evidence that,
even with existing inadequate incentives, biotech
16
44 This is changing both in national programs (for example, maize streak virus GMOs at the University of Capetown) and at
international agricultural research centers (for example, maize at the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture [IITA], rice at
IRRI, sorghum, chickpea at the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics [ICRISAT], and so on). 
45 One reviewer writes: “GM drought resistance will require a huge investment and I don’t see the private sector doing it . . . .
The CGIAR Challenge Programs on genomics [and water] may be too dispersed [given limited funding]” (personal communica-
tion with author).      companies can generate transgenics-based crop
science to address key unsolved problems of the
farming poor.
46 However, its applicability is
squeezed between (a) the shortage of new water
science, and (b) the farming poor’s intensifying
water crisis, as water is diverted to meet pressing
domestic needs, and probably as global warming
cuts rainfall reliability and increases evapotranspi-
ration (IFAD 2001). Transgenics-reinforced crop
science may well improve resistance to moisture
stress (for example, Nuffield Council on Bioethics
2004, 3.42) and, later, perhaps (polygene) water-
to-output conversion efficiency. Yet this must be
complemented not just by water-market and institu-
tional change (World Water Council 2000) but
also by new basic water science and engineering:
the first blue revolution for 2,000 years.
It would be a risky folly to assume that the lucky
conversion of increased food availability into
increased food entitlements for all the three main
dollar-poor groups, achieved by the Green
Revolution in parts of Asia and Latin America, will
carry over into the (essential) biotech-based, water-
economizing attack on poverty in those areas of
Africa and the Asian interior lacking adequate
water, or where reliable water control is
uneconomic. Radical scientific and institutional
innovation is needed. However, tearing down
institutions, and locating and building new ones, is
seldom a cost-effective path. It may also camouflage
key issues, both of the content of science needed for
rapid poverty reduction and of relations between
public-purpose research institutions, their sometimes
flighty and fashion-driven funders, and outstanding
but “misincentived” private-sector researchers.
6. The land/water distribution precondi-
tion for family farming to cut mass dollar
poverty, met in much of Green Revolution
Asia, is violated in much of southern, and
some of eastern, Africa.
This violation is due to the historically extreme
inequality of farmland and water, and in some
countries to considerable inequality within
traditional land systems (for recent survey work see
Jayne et al. 2003) or to the politicized economy of
land redistribution to yeoman politicians.
47
Regions with mass poverty, but where family
farming has been subverted by history, need to get
their large, low-employment landholdings to shift
towards not-too-unequal family farms (as consensu-
ally as is feasible). Land reform has large,
under-rated achievements in reducing mass poverty,
where incentives and technical prospects for post-
reform family farms are right (IFAD 2001, 73–90).
Land reform remains urgent in Latin America and
southern Africa, and in many transitional
economies. Some countries—first and most dramati-
cally China in 1977–84, but later Albania,
Armenia, Romania, and Viet Nam—have
addressed the central issues of egalitarian privatiza-
tion of state and collective lands, but most have not.
7. The land/water sustainability precondi-
tion is most threatened by crop expansion
into marginal lands.
Some aspects of intensification raise serious
environmental concerns: loss of biodiversity, without
adequate safeguards (good, duplicated ex situ
17
46 See Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2004. They include widespread smallholder adoption of Bt cotton, Chinese and Indian
public-sector biotechnology, Monsanto’s release of data on the rice genome, and Syngenta’s of patents for provitamin-A-
enriched rice, which requires transgenics and addresses a key nutrition problem affecting millions of poor people. 
47 The land/water distribution precondition is also violated in much of Latin America and West Asia/North Africa (WANA);
there, however, dollar poverty is less prevalent (though more so than would be predicted from GDP per person), and nonagri-
cultural escape is easier. Across main developing regions, the latest (post-1990) FAO Agricultural Censuses indicate that the
unweighted country-average Ginis of distribution of operated farmland were 0.49 for Sub-Saharan Africa (from 11 available
country censuses); 0.71 for WANA (from 8 censuses); 0.59 for South Asia (from 5 censuses); 0.53 for East and Southeast Asia
(from 7 censuses, excluding China); 0.75 for the Caribbean (from 8 censuses); and 0.84 for mainland South and Central
America (from 12 censuses) (Eastwood, Lipton, and Newell 2006, forthcoming).collections, and sometimes in situ conservation
areas), inappropriate or excessive pesticide use,
water and plant nutrient depletion due to poor
recycling of water and (especially in monocultures)
of plant nutrients, salinity and waterlogging, and
nitrate and nitrite buildup in drinking water
imperfectly separated from excess nitrogen fertiliza-
tion and ill-drained farm water. However, it is
science that can, and does, address such matters—
not generalized anathemas by the well-fed against
all intensive farming. These make little environ-
mental sense in general. Yield growth, based on
much higher inputs of fertilizer and managed water,
remains the only hope to save Africa’s soils, water,
and biota from uncontrolled expansion of cropping
into marginal lands. However, the above specific
environmental concerns, while not obviating the
environmental need for yield-increasing intensifica-
tion through innovation in crop science, may
narrow the acceptable means to that end.
8. Farm supports in Europe and the United
States, and recently in emerging Asian
countries like Japan and South Korea,
have cumulatively increased, undermining
incentives for developing-country agricul-
ture by drastically depressing farm prices.
The precondition for farm-based initial mass
poverty reduction of no systematic incentive destruc-
tion was undermined by domestic policies in Africa,
Asia, and Latin America until the mid-1980s.
Policies to extract resources from farmers (to support
industry and the state) turned prices, subsidies, and
support, such as road, health, and education
provision, heavily against rural areas and farmers
and in favor of capital use—that is, against employ-
ment (Lipton 1977; Krueger, Valdes, and Schiff
1996).
48 Most developing countries have greatly
reduced such destruction of incentives to employ-
ment-intensive farming. However, the baton of such
incentive destruction has passed to the North. First,
familiarly and increasingly,
49 state subsidies and
protection stimulate Northern farmers to overpro-
duce, glutting world markets and reducing
incentives to Southern farmers. Second, perhaps
even more seriously, farm subsidies and protection
in rich countries induce Northern farmers to pay for
more national science, to produce yet more output
that would not be commercial at free prices. This
output compounds the effect of directly subsidy-
induced overproduction in undermining farm
incentives for the South. Third, global science is
diverted away from the farm goals of the poor
(notably employment-generating paths to higher
yields of cheap staples that are more robust under
moisture and biotic stresses) towards demands
inflated by Western farm support—from rich farmers,
intermediary processors, and supermarkets—for
labor-saving production via herbicide-tolerance,
longer shelf-life, and so on. Even in poor countries,
large, low-employment farms get technology spin-
offs from all this, but it undermines
employment-intensive small family farms, both by
scientific neglect and by subsidized and science-
inflated competition.
To some extent, therefore, the prospects of
better crop science to help the rural poor in global-
izing economies depend on agricultural trade and
policy reform in OECD nations. Some will think this
is too gloomy a view. After all, the Green Revolution
slashed poverty in Asia despite already massive
OECD price distortions glutting world markets and
sabotaging prices and incentives for many staples
and for other temperate or temperate-competing
crops—and despite domestic price regimes that, on
balance, made agricultural production in Asia even
less rewarding. This was because, in developing
48 So how come there was a Green Revolution? It spread dramatically only where a good proportion of such extracted
resources was plowed back into science-based farm investment, mostly as irrigation and research. Leading scientists, such as
Norman Borlaug, and thoughtful ministers, such as India’s C. Subramaniam, did much to bring this about. 
49 See Eastwood, Lipton, and Newell (2006, forthcoming): “In 1995, OECD agricultural subsidies to producers totaled
US$182 billion, or 40 percent of production. OECD farm producer prices were 66 percent above border prices (de Moor
1996). Subsidies reached $248 billion [per year] in 1999–2001 (Ricupero 2003).”  
18countries, prices of domestic staples, including
transport costs, usually remained competitive with
dumped OECD exports, especially under Green
Revolution conditions. Rises in output per unit of
input—and, in later stages of the Green Revolution,
in robustness to pests—achievable on family farms
as a result of the new varieties, were enough to
outweigh the falling prices of farm outputs relative
to inputs.
50 In addition, while in general extractive
from agriculture, most Asian governments kept and
used the power to use stocking and other policies to
stop farm price falls in the face of import surges.
None of these safeguards, against subversion of
pro-poor effects from farm science by OECD
dumping, is powerful in the poorest countries today.
Some (those in food deficit) can mitigate the
disincentives by focusing on crops that are consum-
able on or near farms in remote or ill-connected
areas that rely on bad and costly transport for
protection, but at huge efficiency cost.  
Most of Sub-Saharan Africa and many parts of
Asia find it increasingly hard to compete against
dumped staples imports, especially as international
(though in Africa not national) transport costs per
unit of output have fallen since the 1970s. The
range of Northern farmers stimulated into dumping
via farm support has been extended by European
Union (EU) enlargements and by the U.S. Farm Bill
of 2002. U.S., and recently EU, reforms are
gradually switching farm support from a produc-
tion to an area basis, but this switch applies much
less to crops where developing countries are most
competitive: crops such as cotton, sugar, and
tobacco, as well as some main staples. The
countries joining the EU in its 2004 enlargement
(and those at the top of the waiting list) are more
agricultural and less competitive than existing EU
members. While temporarily excluded from much
EU farm support, in the medium term the
newcomers will add to the pressures for its contin-
uance, and to the sources of overproduction from
which developing countries suffer. Yet domestic
OECD fiscal and consumer pressures increasingly
combine to oppose the self-defeating farm
supports. Aid agencies and crop scientists should
lend what support they can; their outputs, too, are
devalued and distorted by Northern farm supports.
Oxfam’s greatly increased emphasis on the harm
done to the world’s poor by cotton and sugar
subsidies is welcome and may, with other
pressures, have some effect.
9. In rich countries, small-scale family
farmers (often relatively poor there) are a
major effective pressure towards farm
supports, which impede the absolute poor
in poor countries—as family farmers, farm
workers, and usually food consumers—
from reducing their poverty.
Political economy, not malice, is at work. Mancur
Olson has argued that in lobbying, “small is
effective”; small groups can more readily collect
fees and subscriptions, as no member can
confidently (or, as a rule, secretly) free-ride on the
contributions of others. Indeed, major parts of U.S.
and EU farm support are captured by a few
wealthy farms (see, however, footnote 16).
However, it is small and family farms in the North
that perpetuate its farm support regimes. The few
rich farmers need support from many others to
acquire political clout (for example, in France, to
block roads with tractors when farm support is
threatened). It is relatively poor family farms that, in
democracies, underpin rich farmers’ lobbying for
ever-greater farm support. It is “saving” the family
farm, with its supposed contribution (for example)
to the French landscape, culture, and “la France
profonde,” that motivates many urban people to
accept the costs of farm support. Nevertheless, the
concentration of farm size and the decline in family
and self-employed farm personnel as a proportion
of the farm workforce—and probably the decline
of, at least, small-scale family management—has
50 This was due to rising supply of farm products (caused both by the Green Revolution itself and by increasing farm support
in the OECD, directly via incentives to OECD farmers and indirectly as new farm research for them was stimulated) and,
therefore, to rising demand for farm inputs to grow them.  
19been faster in most of the EU than under most of the
less-protectionist farm regimes of the Cairns
group
51(FAO 2004b; ILO 2004).
To reason with the advocates of farm support—
and hence to reverse the resulting anti-poor
depression of farm prices and distortion of farm
science—it is essential to understand the persist-
ence, evolution, and growing power of family
farming during the evolution from very poor,
through emerging, to developed polities and
economies. Though rising capital/labor ratios in
economic development mean that very small farms
come to operate less and less of the farmland, this
does not mean that family farms die away (see the
data on Europe and North America on pages
4–5). Indeed, their persistence, growing political
clout, and relative low incomes, rather than
possible “Olsonian” organizing advantages of a
few giant farmers and their lobbies, explain the
persistence and scale of farm support and protec-
tionism in OECD countries, despite the huge
damage not only to the absolute poor in
developing countries but also to consumers,
taxpayers, and efficient growth in developed
economies. Further, as poor developing countries
(normally based on smallholder growth and mass
poverty reduction) emerge from underdevelopment
and become Koreas or Mexicos, their family
farmers also use their growing power to get the
“OECD drug” of farm support. This harms both the
impoverished farmer/farm worker populations of
remaining mass poverty countries, and their
governments’ bargaining power, at the World
Trade Organization (WTO) Doha round and
subsequently. This “family farm logic” is at the root
of farm protectionism as an enemy of poverty
reduction. The OECD and emerging-country
family-farm lobbies will not respond to economic
theory alone, however valid. If the above logic is
tackled, and the lobby is reasoned with and shown
alternatives, victory is possible.
10. Remedies are urgent, because poverty
reduction will become much harder after
the closure of the window of opportunity
created for developing countries by the
population slowdown, with its temporary
(30- to 40- year) but sharp effect in cutting
the dependency ratio.
In East Asia, the effect of new farm technologies in
reducing poverty incidence in 1965–2000 was
much amplified by the falling dependency ratio (see
footnote 9). Lower proportions of dependents were
supported by fast-rising numbers of workers, for
many of whom the new farm technology provided
rising employment income. The fertility reductions
that amplified this process
52 came somewhat later to
South Asia and Africa but are now sharply cutting
dependency ratios for poor countries in these
regions too. In 2000, there were 94 dependents for
every 100 people aged 15–64 in Ethiopia; the
projection for 2030 is 67. Over the same period,
the dependency ratio is projected to fall from 99 to
67 in Nigeria, from 79 to 55 in Bangladesh, and
from 71 to 58 in India. These are recent estimates,
51 The Cairns Group, set up in August 1986, now includes 17 developed and middle-income countries, together accounting
for 23 percent of world farm exports. It is committed to achieve “a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system [and]
to ensure that the next WTO agriculture negotiations . . . put trade in agricultural goods on the same basis as trade in other
goods. All trade distorting subsidies must be eliminated and market access must be substantially improved so that agricultural
trade can proceed on the basis of market forces” (Cairns Group 1998).
52 The process began with big declines in infant mortality rates during 1945–60 because malaria was controlled and nutrition
improved. This first raised dependency ratios, but as the population of “saved” infants grew into working age, the rise steadily
slowed. By the 1970s in most of Asia and by the 1980s in Africa, fertility was falling, and so were dependency ratios. 
53 Data are from ECOSOC (2004). HIV/AIDS mainly hits infants and persons aged 15 to 30 years. The effects on the depend-
ency ratio are offsetting.
54 In 1962–90, the declining dependency rate added 1.7 percent per year to growth of income per person in East and
Southeast Asia (Bloom and Williamson 1997).   
20taking account of HIV/AIDS.
53 They reveal a
window of opportunity for growth
54 and poverty
reduction. If the conditions on land and water use,
farm technology, and incentives are roughly met—
providing, as earlier in East Asia, substantial extra
income-earning chances for the rural poor—the
ideal time for family-farm-led poverty reduction is
about 2000–40. If those chances are not provided
by crop science and appropriate policy, the extra
workers will face downward pressure on rural
wage-rates or employment, and the opportunity
will be lost after 2030–50,
55 as aging populations
put the dependency ratio into reverse (that is, it
starts to rise again). 
Why was the opportunity seized in East Asia?
Irrigation and new crop science meant that the
extra workers found work on family farms, with
rising rewards per hour worked. Many could thus
pull their (relatively dwindling) number of
dependent relatives out of poverty. With a less
employment-oriented, or slower, path of agrotech-
nical progress, the rising supply of workers would
have faced more sluggish farm demand and would
have earned far less income. The techniques
introduced by new crop science, too, will need to
be employment-intensive—to walk the labor–land
productivity tightrope. Employment-related goals
need to be incorporated systematically in crop
research planning, even in most of Sub-Saharan
Africa, though with due allowance for local and
seasonal variation in labor supply.
11. The poor potentially gain from global-
ization, but such gains are often small,
and sometimes there are losses. Can crop
science for family farms help?
In the narrow economic sense, globalization
involves (a) the secular trend, however incomplete
and interrupted, to de-restrict international flows of
goods, services,
56 money, labor and investment,
and hence science and technology; (b) the
consequently rising share of international flows in
total flows; and (c) the further result that trade and
investment outcomes, including research patterns,
are increasingly determined at world or individual
levels, and decreasingly at national levels.
57
What is the interaction between family
farming, poverty, and crop science in the context
of narrowly defined economic globalization? Freer
trade induces specialization along lines of compar-
ative advantage—that is, in products using a
nation’s more plentiful resources (others being
more readily, and more cheaply, importable). Also,
freer foreign investment flows will be attracted to a
nation for production lines that use those plentiful
resources. Most developing areas are labor-rich
and capital-poor. So most globalization
58 should
increase their specialization in high-employment
farms and crops. That should make it easier to
attack mass poverty through extra employment,
productivity, food output, and income growth from
small family farms. Apart from growth effects,
53 Data are from ECOSOC (2004). HIV/AIDS mainly hits infants and persons aged 15 to 30 years. The effects on the depend-
ency ratio are offsetting.
54 In 1962–90, the declining dependency rate added 1.7 percent per year to growth of income per person in East and
Southeast Asia (Bloom and Williamson 1997).   
55 The date of the turning point varies by country, as did the earlier changes that set the whole process going (see footnote 52).  
56 A highly relevant consequence is the removal of obstructions to the “law of one price,” and hence a leveling of prices,
allowing for transport costs. This highlights the nonglobalization of agriculture by OECD nations and the plea from developing
countries that they too be allowed to compete!   
57 In addition to the economic implications of globalization, growing proportions of ownership, power, tastes, and cultures
transcend national borders. This widens choices for some people but also, many fear, homogenizes local cultures and—
ironically, given the supposed alliance between decontrol and globalization—increases the control of global outcomes by
dominant world or regional powers, companies, or cultures.  
58 This includes investment by transnational corporations (TNCs). As Western complaints about call-center outsourcing indicate,
TNC investment leaves rich countries for developing countries partly to exploit low labor costs, but in so doing it bids up wages
and employment, cutting poverty.  This logic does not justify financial liberalization (Stiglitz 2003). “Hot money,” without strong
financial institutions and regulation, can destabilize growth, making the poor more vulnerable.  
21globalization should, within developing countries,
make income distribution more pro-poor.
59
Furthermore, freer trade and direct investment
expose countries to more learning—about
technology and markets—and to more participation
in frontier science and technical progress.
60 In
developed countries freer international flows of
trade and direct investment (while still raising GDP
via specialization and learning) steer resources
away from lines of production using a lot of
unskilled labor and can thus harm distribution,
unless poor losers are up-skilled, resettled, or
otherwise compensated. This issue is crucial for
farm reform in OECD countries. But such freer flows
in labor-surplus developing countries can be
expected, barring severe distortions or restrictions
of access, to be clearly pro-poor. 
There is no space here to review the massive
and controversial evidence, but on balance it is
consistent with the view that since 1980 developing
countries that liberalized trade faster enjoyed faster
growth, bringing faster poverty reduction—but not
(as predicted above) pro-poor shifts in income distri-
bution. While preaching freer trade to an
increasingly persuaded South, the North increas-
ingly supported its own agriculture (see footnote
49). Therefore, gains to labor-intensive family
farmers in the South from globalization were
impeded by the steady undermining of farm prices
via subsidies to Northern overproduction, and by
the responses of science to such incentives. This
impediment was overcome by Asian net food
importers in 1960–85, because the Green
Revolution raised TFP in farming fast enough to
overcome the effect of falls in farm output prices due
to the OECD’s market-distorting farm support. With
changes in the global organization of science (see
above), that might work for the remaining poverty
heartlands in Africa and parts of Asia, but stronger
pressures against OECD agricultural policy malfea-
sance would greatly improve the prospects.
Also, gains to the rural dollar-poor from global-
ization appear to be seriously threatened by
failures of intermediation between small/family
farms and institutions of exchange that, while long
familiar in developed countries, are near-
newcomers, spreading at unprecedented speed, in
many developing ones: supermarkets, horticultural
export companies, and public and private grades
and standards (Reardon et al. 2001, 2003). As
these spread, small family farms—even while
retaining their advantages of low-cost labor
management in production—may face high unit
costs (notably for quality control, for example, of
pesticide levels, and delivery to outlets) between
the farm and the increasingly concentrated outlets
of the wholesaler or processor. Overcoming such
barriers is feasible, as shown both by recent
examples (Reardon et al. 2003; IFAD 2001, Ch.
5) and by the history of processing, with timing
and quality control, for smallholders in rubber,
sugar, and tea (Binswanger et al. 1995). However,
these examples confirm three facts:
1. In family farming, as in other sectors, the
responsiveness of growth to incentives—
whether created by scientific progress or by
globalization—depends on producers’
prospects of responding to new information,
and therefore on affordable but substantial
provision of, and reasonably equal access
to, education (Jamison and Lau 1982;
Birdsall, Ross, and Sabot 1995).
59 There are caveats. Transferred technology may favor production that is intensive in its use of skills or capital rather than the
labor of the poor. The small share of private international investment reaching the farm sector, and the negligible amount
benefiting family farms, militates against major poverty impact. And the poorest may be insufficiently educated to make use of
new opportunities (as is also a danger with freer trade [Wood 1994])  
60 It is vital, however, that developing countries (public as well as private sectors) are able and willing to select the more labor-
intensive and hence appropriate science, techniques, and lessons from the usually rather capital-intensive mix used, and hence
offered, by the capital-rich developed world, with which developing countries increasingly interact during globalization. This is
central to the pro-poor use of crop science in a globalizing world.     
222. Appropriate farm science increases or
“potentiates” gains from globalization: labor-
intensive small farms are better placed to
raise production in response to freer trade
and investment if they are reached by
appropriate science-led innovations and find
them profitable. Such potentiation requires
communication of information, so that new
science raises the returns to universities and
extension organizations.
3. The poor gain more from all this if they have
not-too-unequal access to land, which may
require land reform.
In much but not all of Asia, these conditions
were met to a significant extent prior to the large
acceleration of open trade and foreign direct
investment, and to a lesser extent foreign financial
flows, that constituted economic globalization. The
parts of Asia left behind in the surge of mass
poverty reduction overlap all too well with the
countries, and even the regions within countries,
that were for some reason denied a Green
Revolution, not-too-unequal family farming, adequate
near-universal (that is, rurally extended and
gender-blind) primary schooling, or all three. In
Sub-Saharan Africa, with a few exceptions, the
general failure to use farm science to achieve
substantial and sustainable acceleration of family
farm growth before the thrust to globalization has
made it harder for globalization to help much in
reducing poverty. The responsiveness of aggregate
farm output, and hence employment, to better farm
prices or export access, for example, is small if the
productivity of labor and land are low and
sluggish.
23Dollar poverty probably fell faster in 1960–90 than
in the previous five centuries, and crop science can
claim much of the credit. Yet both staples yields and
(except in China) poverty reduction have languished
since 1990, responding more slowly to economic
growth than previously. Aid donors and recipients
now agree that aid should be targeted to help
developing countries halve dollar poverty incidence
in 1990–2015. We are falling well behind that
target. Since the late 1980s, aid to agriculture, on
which most of the dollar-poor depend, has fallen in
real terms by over two-thirds, while public-purpose
crop science, at international levels and in most of
the developing world outside China and India, has
been cut back. Mass poverty reduction initially
depends on widespread growth of farm productivity
and employment income, and hence on specific
scientific progress, usable by small family farmers,
mostly in so far recalcitrant areas. Such science
needs to see productive employment creation—not
make-work, of course—in agriculture as a benefit,
not a cost. There is a profound global common
interest in farm science to remove the causes of
mass poverty, which, in the midst of increasingly
visible prosperity, is a sea in which terrorists swim,
while weak states fail and drown.
24
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